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Missile Defence Working Group
A number of like-minded
organisations have met regularly on an informal basis to oppose collectively
UK involvement in US missile defence plans. The Missile Defence Working
Group was formed by Abolition 2000 UK, Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT),
Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases (CAAB), Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Medact, Northern Friends Peace Board, Quaker
Peace and Social Witness and United Nations Association, among others.
Our common concerns include the impact of US missile defence on international
relations, the arms control regime and future peace and security, and also
on the security of the United Kingdom.
The Missile Defence Working
Group was officially launched at a Forum on US Missile Defence in central
London on 31 May 2001.
Executive summary
The fall of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty on 13 June 2002 prepared the ground for the United
States administration to push ahead with a strategic missile defence (MD)
system, which had been prohibited under this bilateral agreement with Russia.
During the preceding months, a series of diplomatic initiatives aimed at
mitigating the damage from US unilateral withdrawal eventually culminated
in Russian acquiescence with the US MD plans. The US commitment to MD should
be seen in the context of a reaffirmation of the role of nuclear weapons
in its security policy. This 'sword and shield' approach to security has
far-reaching ramifications for international relations, international security
and the future of arms control in particular. The proposed use of US bases
within the UK as part of a US MD system is cause for public and parliamentary
concern. Ten points are outlined here:
We believe that the UK should not be party to a US MD system and call for a full public and parliamentary debate.
US Missile Defence: Ten reasons for UK concern
Introduction
The United States' withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty took effect on 13 June 2002, concluding the six months formal notification required by the terms of the agreement.
President Bush announced
the decision to withdraw so that the US can "develop effective
defences" against missile
attack by terrorists or "states of concern",1 specifically Iran, Iraq and
North Korea.
Although proponents of strategic missile defence (MD)2 have argued that the ABM Treaty is strictly a matter for the US and Russia, the ramifications of US unilateral withdrawal and the decision to proceed with MD reach far beyond this relationship. The annulment of this treaty marks a milestone in arms control and disarmament; it sets a precedent for withdrawal from international agreements while seriously jeopardising the non-proliferation regime. It also represents a turning point in the MD debate because the importance of the ABM Treaty had been the focus of many objections to a US MD system. In particular, it was the fall of the ABM Treaty that precipitated Russia's reluctant acquiescence with US MD ambitions.
The events of 11 September
2001 strengthened the resolve of the US administration to push
ahead with MD despite its
obvious futility in the face of similar attacks. Washington has also taken
the opportunity afforded by the shift in the international security paradigm
to frame a destabilizing surge in militarisation. US global military hegemony
(MD being its pinnacle) cannot be matched but Russia and China can be expected
to respond to offset the threat that both states still perceive to their
strategic position in relation to the US. While the proliferation of WMD
is a legitimate concern, this paper argues that MD is unlikely to deter
or prevent a missile attack. At the same time, US contempt for multilateral
approaches aimed at tackling these threats continues to hinder the rest
of the international community from moving forward in this area.
The role of UK-based facilities
in a US MD system, specifically those at Menwith Hill and
Fylingdales in Yorkshire,
is a matter of national public concern and thus warrants full parliamentary
consideration and consultation. While the UK position on involvement in
this system through the use of these bases remains unclear, Whitehall has
on several occasions conveyed implicit support for a US MD system. Most
recently Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary, described how MD could contribute
to disarmament.3 The purpose of this paper is to challenge this view by
presenting a ten-point critique of US MD. We conclude by proposing concrete,
practical alternatives for addressing the proliferation of missile technology
and WMD.
Ten reasons for UK concern
In the light of this, many
analysts believe that the physical threat from ballistic missile proliferation
has been exaggerated in order to provide a rationale for a MD system. Besides
their suggested defensive capability, US MD ambitions appear to be part
of a wider strategy to maintain strategic supremacy over other nations.
This is clear from US security policy, which states that US forces must
"defeat the efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States,
its allies, or friends…" and that it must be possible "to impose the will
of the United States and its coalition partners on any adversaries, including
states…"4 This is the language not of physical security but of strategic
struggle and based on a logic similar to that underlying the Cold War arms
race.
Once US MD is considered
in this context, the protests of other states are better understood, particularly
their concerns about strategic stability and the threat perceived from
unfettered US power.
2. New nuclear risks
The ABM Treaty acted as
a deterrent between the US and Soviet Union, ensuring that both remained
mutually vulnerable to nuclear strikes. Thus its removal, combined with
US deployment of MD, challenges the deterrent credibility of Russia, but
more so China by denying these states the ability to retaliate against
a first strike. This also threatens non-proliferation strategies, potentially
leading to further militarisation of international relations.5 Russia and
China have sought to offset this shift in the status quo through both political
and military responses. The new accord, which commits Russia and
the US to slash their nuclear arsenals to between around 1,700 and 2,200
weapons, appears a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament, allaying
fears over proliferation. This is not the case because these reductions
are neither permanent nor meaningful. This treaty contains no requirement
to destroy the warheads once they are taken out of service and it expires
in ten years allowing each country to return to previous levels. Moreover,
it provides a convenient framework for both countries to pursue a process
of nuclear modernisation since it does not restrict the development of
new nuclear weapons. These cuts will enable Russia to concentrate its limited
financial resources (currently tied up in maintaining around 6,000 weapons)
on streamlining, not eliminating, its nuclear deterrent, particularly as
it allows Russia to retain land-based multiple warhead missiles. The US
has already reaffirmed that nuclear weapons will continue to "play a critical
role" and suggested in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review Report that it intends
to develop new nuclear weapons and resume testing - ambitions characteristic
of an offensive strategy.6
So far China's opposition
has been mainly political. It has been outspoken in the Conference on Disarmament
where it outlined strong concerns over US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
and the strategic impact of US MD. The challenge that MD poses to China's
relatively limited nuclear capability is likely to lead Beijing to adjust
its current programme of modernisation and expansion of strategic weapons.
This is likely to force changes in China's nuclear posture, including deployment
of multiple warhead missiles or putting its nuclear weapons on high alert.
China may choose to continue the export of ballistc missile and countermeasure
technology to states like Pakistan and Iran, despite US objections. If
Taiwan acquires MD technologies from the US this will further aggravate
Sino-American tensions and lead to missile build-up across the Taiwan Strait.
A surge in militarisation in the region could also have severe repercussions
for nuclear and missile proliferation, especially in the context of India
and Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.
3. Undermining disarmament
The ABM Treaty was an integral
part of the arms control regime. By helping to build some trust between
the two superpowers, it helped to facilitate key nuclear arms reduction
treaties. In 2001, President Bush said he believed that the treaty did
"not recognise the present, nor point us to the future."7 Yet as recently
as 2000, the ABM Treaty was described by all 187 states parties to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as "a cornerstone of strategic stability"
that needed preserving and strengthening.8 United Nations Secretary-General
Kofi Annan expressed concern "that the annulation of this [ABM] treaty
may provoke an arms race… and further undermine disarmament and non-proliferation
regimes."9 Germany, Sweden, France, Russia and China were among the many
states that also criticised the US decision to withdraw.
Announced reductions in the US arsenal, agreed with Russia in May 2002, are not a substitute for a commitment to the arms control regime and multilateral disarmament process. The weapons cuts should be seen in the context of a US policy, in which, "over the coming decades", nuclear weapons will "continue to play a critical role."10 US missile defence itself presumes the continued existence of nuclear weapons and so represents a major threat to the trust and good faith needed for progress towards disarmament. The US commitment to sword and shield, represented by nuclear weapons and missile defences respectively, when considered alongside apparent intentions to resume nuclear testing,11 threatens key international agreements that limit nuclear dangers and facilitate progress towards disarmament. Most notably, these include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. UN Under-secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala believes that current US policy "flies in the face" of undertakings under the NPT, which commits Nuclear Weapons States to negotiating nuclear disarmament.12 The dispute over MD has also made worse an impasse over negotiations on crucial new treaties to ban the production of fissile materials and to prevent an arms race in space.
The consequences for arms control of the trend in US policy are far-reaching. Jeopardising the arms control regime and disarmament negotiations risks a resumption of nuclear testing around the globe, the weaponisation of space, the end of reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, and the eventual breakdown of the non-proliferation regime. This could lead to widespread and rapid proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles, the remilitarisation of international relations and possible conflict using WMD. The very existence of missile defences will have done much to generate the threat that they are intended to defend the US against.
These developments ought to arouse publicly expressed concern from the UK Government with its policy commitment to the arms control and disarmament regime - yet none appears to be forthcoming.
Instead, the Government believes
that missile defences can play a role within "a comprehensive strategy
to tackle the potential threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery."13 This in-principle acceptance of missile defences
undermines existing UK policy commitments to all these treaties and initiatives
threatened by US missile defence plans and its nuclear policy. The UK risks
becoming hostage to a damaging trend in US policy that includes a deep
mistrust of treaty agreements in general, while compromising this Government's
often more constructive approach to arms control and disarmament negotiations.
4. The weaponisation
of space
Fears that MD conceals a
more sinister agenda to weaponise space are justified in the context of
trends in US policy on the military use of space. This policy has been
mostly framed in the context of defences, conveniently deflecting attention
away from the offensive capabilities of a space-based 'defence system'.
Washington intends to embrace a system that would ultimately use space-based
lasers and interceptors to intercept incoming missiles. However, both the
rhetoric and technical developments as revealed in several public documents
imply an approach to space policy that moves beyond defence of the US mainland.
The report from the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management
and Organisation from January 2001 stated its belief that "the U.S. government
should vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space
Policy to ensure that the president will have the option to deploy weapons
in space to deter threats to, and, if necessary, defend against attacks
on U.S. interests."14
In May 2001, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld unveiled changes to his country's military structures boosting the development of futuristic orbiting weapons, not only as part of MD but also to protect satellites crucial to its forces.15 "Ensuring the freedom of access to space and protecting US national security interests" have become key priorities for the US Defence Department.16 According to the Quadrennial Defence Review Report, challenges facing US defence"require enhancing the capability and survivability of US space systems… [with] the exploitation of space and the denial of the use of space to adversaries."17 This means deploying both offensive and defensive capabilities (clearly beyond the scope of MD) such as the space-based laser and the space-based, kinetic-kill interceptor.
Although the testing of space
weapons for MD and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) is probably a decade away,
work on some of the other technologies such as lower earth orbital interceptors
for theatre MD or sea based MD are now likely to accelerate with the demise
of the ABM Treaty18. For those left in any doubt, the pursuit of space
superiority is made very clear in the US Space Command document Vision
for 2020 ; it describes space as the next medium of warfare. Placing
weapons in space would jeopardise satellite communications, exacerbate
military competition among adversaries and intensify an arms race. The
enormous setback to the disarmament agenda that the weaponisation of space
would represent is obvious. Moderate voices in the Pentagon concerned about
the problems of debris from space warfare,19 coupled with Congressional
cuts in funding, may delay deployment sufficiently for the international
community to foster the conclusion of an agreement preventing weapons in
space.
5. A matter of sovereignty
and accountability
Despite repeated parliamentary
questions about the role of RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales in US
plans to deploy MD, this Government has maintained an official position
of postponing any decision on these bases until it has received a firm
proposal from the US. However, over the past year Whitehall has expressed
increasing support for MD, especially in the wake of 11 September. UK sympathy
has extended to mutual concern over fears of WMD proliferation as Geoff
Hoon, Defence Secretary, took the opportunity to say during a Commons Defence
Select Committee hearing on international issues relating to MD systems:
This Committee hearing was not followed by a full parliamentary debate, unlike in Denmark.21 Despite the overwhelming concern expressed by over 270 Members of Parliament who supported an Early Day Motion on this issue, this Government has so far avoided a parliamentary consultation about the implications of UK involvement.
Protests over the lack of consultation about the future of Menwith Hill and Fylingdales have also fuelled speculation about the degree of control the RAF and the British Government have over these US-operated bases, raising serious doubts about the authority the Government has to sanction their use. There is little open information about the exact nature of the tenure. Menwith Hill is already an integral part of the US National Security Agency (NSA) global communications network, controversial for its role in the Echelon eavesdropping system. Within the MD system, it would function as a relay ground station for satellite information, providing early
Whilst we as of today see no direct threat from these weapons to the United Kingdom, the fact that if certain states of concern do acquire complete systems of sufficient range then they might be capable of targeting the United Kingdom within the next few years is something that we consider very seriously.20
warning of hostile missile
launches. This system is known as Space-Based Infra Red System - High.
The Government stated that SBIRS - High is required independently of MD
but has also acknowledged that MD would make use of it.22 The base at Fylingdales
currently also provides early warning of missile launches. To accurately
track missiles and enable the system to intercept them, it would need to
be upgraded in a way that would have breached the ABM Treaty. Some reports
indicate that the British Government granted permission for an initial
upgrade of Fylingdales in early 2000.23
6. A threat to UK security
The strategic value of these
radar sites could make the UK a target if an attack was launched at the
system. This concern was shared by over 72% of British respondents to a
MORI poll conducted in July 2001.24 Little consideration has been given
to the impact on the local population of a strike on either Fylingdales
or Menwith Hill using a WMD. While the Government has attempted to shun
criticism in the interest of 'national security', UK involvement in MD
and the wider global implications go beyond national security and thus
it behoves the Government to be more open and accountable. Tony Blair has
said: This Government cannot simply dismiss its critics by presenting
an ambiguous official policy while discussion with the US seems to be clearly
leading towards UK involvement.
7. An unfeasible defence
In the past, MD systems
developed by the US and the Soviet Union have been abandoned due to the
technical hurdles involved.26 Development of current technologies has been
subject to setbacks that, according to some reports, have been played down
by the arms corporations involved. The removal of normal oversight procedures
for the US Missile Defence Agency has added further doubt to the integrity
of the testing regime.27Even if an operational MD is technically possible,
the effectiveness of any system must always remain in doubt. The most obvious
weakness is the vulnerability of vital radar stations and satellites placed
beyond the protection of the defence system in order to give adequate warning
of hostile missile launches. In theory, a missile attack against the US
could be preceded by an attack against these unprotected facilities, first
rendering the defence system useless.
Another problem is that numerous countermeasures can be added easily to a hostile missile to fool or overwhelm a mid-course interception system. A single missile could be equipped with many readily available technologies, such as decoy warheads, multiple warheads, chaff, radar-absorbing materials, or low-power jamming technologies. Although the US testing regime is attempting to overcome some of these measures, Stephen Young of the Union of Concerned Scientists points out that a problem of principle remains: "It is substantially easier and cheaper to deploy simple and effective countermeasures against missile defences than it
I do not agree with those who are opposed to it [US MD]. During the summit with President Bush in February, we made it clear that we were prepared to look atd defensive as well as offensive systems.25
is for the defence to respond
to them."28 The advantage is always with the attacker, such that even if
an operational missile defence system became possible, it could not be
reliable. As French President Jacques Chirac has argued: "If you look at
world history, … there's a permanent race between sword and shield. The
sword always wins."29
8. A misuse of resources
The US is developing a large,
readily extendable MD using a range of technologies pushed by a host of
arms manufacturing corporations.30 If all programmes now under development
become operational, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated the cost
of such a system at $238 billion to 2025.31 Much of the impetus for MD
comes from arms manufacturers, which stand to gain the lion's share of
this spending, having successfully lobbied to keep the missile defence
idea alive in Washington since the end of the Cold War.32 This resource
commitment reveals an indifference to those numbering approximately 1.2
billion living in conditions of extreme poverty worldwide,33 as well as
to the pressing problems of social exclusion in the US itself.34 The Pentagon's
Vision for 2020 document, which reveals that a multi-layered MD system
would be used "to protect US interests and investment",35 exposes its non-defensive
purpose. A developed MD system would thus serve to perpetuate the global
wealth divide in the narrow interests of the most powerful. Inclusion of
Britain within the defensive range of the US system would reportedly cost
£10 billion, more than 40% of the UK defence budget.36
It is only a commitment by
the West to an inclusive global society that will allow the world's systemic
causes of insecurity to be addressed. The economic and political marginlisation
of the majority world and the consequent resentment over this that fuels
adversarial relations with the West is a major threat to future peace and
security. The scale of resources committed to MD could be applied to these
causes to good effect. But US MD ambitions, considered alongside the reaffirmation
of nuclear weapons, represent a divisive policy based on coercion and control
- an attempt to suppress resentment towards the West with little commitment
to tackling the conditions that give rise to it.
9. Risks to health and
the environment
One of the possible systems
under consideration would involve intercepting a missile during its boost
phase. The 'boost phase' system is supposed to destroy the booster but
may not 'kill' the warhead, which could fall short of its intended target.
Nuclear contamination from a warhead that simply broke up on impact would
badly contaminate the land with plutonium and remain dangerous for perhaps
thousands of years. The plutonium fall-out from a warhead that disintegrated
high in the atmosphere would be scattered over a wide area. This would
not cause detectable health effects but would probably cause a significant
increase in the number of cancers.
Similar considerations and
uncertainties apply to missiles armed with chemical and biological weapons.
There is a small but significant risk that a biological warhead falling
to the ground from a boost phase interception could start an epidemic anywhere.
These effects pose particular risks to countries directly under the flight
path of a targeted missile. Considering the widely documented health and
environmental effects of nuclear weapons and energy, a full investigation
into the impact of fall-out from interception for the UK population and
others is absolutely vital.
10. The wrong kind of
solution
US Defence Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld summarised his assessment of challenges to future peace and security
to a NATO meeting by saying "We know this much for certain: it is unlikely
that any of us here even knows what is likely."37 The proliferation of
ballistic missiles and WMD deserves international concern and attention.
However, the Defence Secretary's comment shows that a fear of the unknown
underlies MD and nuclear weapons policy, which is displacing a willingness
to tackle insecurity at its source through diplomatic engagement. Nuclear
weapons and MD are at best a misguided response to a genuine security concern.
At worst, they are part of a cynical attempt to maintain US strategic supremacy
and disproportionate access to the world's strained and limited resources.
US MD ambitions are symptomatic
of broken international relationships. They do not fix them. Future security
lies in a multilateral approach based on the common international interest,
as represented by the proper authority and structure of the United Nations.
The US unilateral approach, including its ability "to impose the will of
the United States and its coalition partners on any adversaries, including
states…,"38 usurps the UN in its function and authority.
A way forward
We believe a US MD system
is a dangerous and misguided response to an exaggerated threat and will
further divide and destabilise the world. We call on the UK Government:
1. Diplomatic engagement
US insistence that Iran,
Iraq and North Korea together represent an 'axis of evil' is divisive and
undermines prospects for progress through diplomacy. Given that bad relations
with these states form the ostensible rationale of a MD system, suspicion
may be justified that the hostile US approach is intended to perpetuate
the problem, rather than transform it. We believe that progress through
diplomacy, in which the UK could choose to lead, is both possible and required
under Article 33 of the UN Charter.39
In relation to Iran, Iraq and North Korea, the following could form the basis of this engagement:
Iran. In September 2001, Jack Straw was the first British foreign secretary to visit Iran since 1979, stating that Anglo-Iranian relations had been steadily improving in recent years.40 There has been some reported success in curtailing and reducing extremist influences in Iran. Britain, which takes a different approach to Iran from that of the US, is well placed to work to improve relations between Iran and the West.
Iraq. The rigid position adopted by the UK and US on economic sanctions against Iraq has made diplomatic progress extremely difficult. However, indications made by Iraq that it may be willing to allow UN weapons inspections under conditions could form the basis for negotiations and should not be dismissed.41 Russia's potential role in negotiations could also be explored to good effect.
North Korea. The 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework brought a halt to North Korea's nuclear programme.42 It showed that North Korea is willing to negotiate constructively in exchange for normalised US-North Korean relations and relaxed sanctions. A resumption of constructive dialogue between North Korea and the US, as well as with South Korea, is essential.
We have focused here on those states from which the US perceives an emerging missile threat. The future of the non-proliferation regime also depends on giving like attention to engaging India, Israel and Pakistan in the process of the abolition of their nuclear weapons programmes.
2. Demonstrable disarmament
commitments by the nuclear weapons states
The value that the acknowledged
Nuclear Weapons States (NWS - China, France, Russia, UK,
USA) continue to place on
nuclear weapons remains a powerful incentive for other states to
acquire their own weapons
of mass destruction. Commitments by the Nuclear Weapons States towards
irreversible nuclear disarmament must be demonstrable, yet their progress
under the Programme of Action since it was agreed at the NPT Sixth Review
Conference in 2000 has been lamentable.
3. Strengthening the structures
and process of arms control and disarmament
Finally, the structures
of arms control and the multilateral disarmament process must be supported
if the ballistic missile threat from all states is to be contained and
reversed. In particular, the equivocation by the NWS, especially the US,
on their commitments to the arms control regime makes halting the spread
of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles a more difficult
goal.
Efforts to curb missile proliferation
have tended to concentrate on extending the Missile
Technology Control Regime
but this has been criticised as a means of enabling states with missile
technology to maintain it indefinitely while excluding others from obtaining
it. Efforts to strengthen the agreement must take account of this criticism.
The development of an International Code of Conduct on ballistic missiles
is currently under way and could provide a more inclusive approach to tackling
the proliferation of missiles. Early US and UK support for this initiative
is welcome with the ultimate aim of a ballistic missile ban underpinning
and informing these efforts.
Conclusion
This paper has outlined
key arguments against UK involvement in a US MD system. It has suggested
viable alternatives, based on multilateral engagement and disarmament,
for addressing the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD. These alternatives
would far better secure international peace and security than the threat
and use of military force.
The UK is well placed to take the lead in pursuing diplomatic engagement and multilateral arms control. It also has responsibility given its commitments under international law and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to examine thoroughly the implications of the collapse of the ABM Treaty and US plans for MD. This applies in terms of both global security and the consequences of UK involvement. This is an issue of major public concern and warrants a full and open public and parliamentary debate.
The Government has so far dismissed concerns regarding the lack of accountability and transparency about a decision to use bases here. It is crucial that Members of Parliament represent the concerns of their constituents through appropriate parliamentary mechanisms to ensure open discussions around any decision, taking into consideration the range of concerns as outlined in this paper.
|
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Dr Frank Barnaby, The
New Terrorism - a 21st Century biological, chemical and nuclear threat
(Oxford Research Group, 2001), 80 pp
Paul Rogers and Scilla Elworthy,
A Never-Ending War? Consequences of 11 September (Oxford
Research Group, 2002), 16 pp
Stephen W Young, Pushing
the Limits - the decision on National Missile Defence (Washington,
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, 2000), 55pp
Missile Defence Working Group briefing,
June 2002.
References
1 'Bush Announces U.S.
Withdrawal From ABM Treaty, Withdrawal becomes effective in six months',
US State Dept, International Information Programs, 13 December 2001. http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/01121302.htm
2 The Bush administration
now refers to Ballistic Missile Defence. We use the generic abbreviation
MD in this paper.
3 Speech given by the
Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw at Kings College, London on 6 February 2002
4 Quadrennial Defence
Review Report, US Department of Defence, 30 September 2001, pp. 12-13.
5 Nick Ritchie, 'The
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Missile Defence', Oxford Research Group, May 2001, p.12.
6 US Nuclear Posture
Review Report submitted to Congress 31 December 2001, p.7.
7President George W Bush,
speech to National Defence University, Washington, 1 May 2001.
8 Programme of Action,
in the Final Document of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Sixth Review
Conference, 2000.
9 Statement of the Secretary-General,
www.un.org, 14 December 2001.
10 US Nuclear Posture
Review Report, Foreword and p. 7.
11 US Nuclear Posture
Review Report, p. 55.
12'US Plan Concerns Top
UN Official' UN Wire, 13 March 2002.
13Secretary of State
for Defence, Geoff Hoon MP, House of Commons debate, 29 April 2002
14Teresa Hitchens, 'Rushing
to Weaponise the Final Frontier' Arms Control Today, September 2001.
15Paul Koring 'U.S. to
Militarise Space,' Globe and Mail, 9 May 2001.
16Quadrennial Defence
Review Report, 30 September 2001.
17Ibid
18James Clay Moltz, 'Breaking
the Deadlock on Space Control,' Arms Control Today, April 2002.
19Ibid.
20House of Commons Defence
Select Committee debate, 20 March 2002.
21Following a Foreign
Policy Committee Conference on 'National Missile Defence: Implications
for Global Order' the Danish Parliament held a full parliamentary debate
on 3 May 2001 about US plans.
22 House of Commons Hansard,
7 February 2000.
23 'Britain may house
"star wars" shield', The Daily Telegraph, 3 March 2000.
24 Press release, '70%
of Britain Fears US Driven Arms Race,’ www.basicint.org
25 House of Commons Hansard
24 October 2001.
26 Associated Press,
4 March, 2002 (BMD 157).
27 Washington Post, 16
February 2002.
28 Stephen W Young, Pushing
the Limits (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Washington, 2000) p. 9.
29 New York Times, 17
December 1999.
30 US Space Command Long
Range Plan notes instrumental involvement of "about 75 corporations".
31 New York Times, 31
January 2002.
32 William Hartung, World
Policy Institute, November 1999.
33 1998 figure, in The
World Bank Annual Report, 2000.
34 In 2000, 11.8% of
US residents lived in poverty. US Census Bureau news release, 26 September
2000.
35 US Space Command,
Vision for 2020, 1997.
36 The Guardian, 25 February
2002.
37 Donald Rumsfeld, US
Defence Secretary, in a speech to NATO North Atlantic Council, June 2001.
38 Op cit. Quadrennial
Defence Review Report, 30 September 2001, pp. 12-13.
39United Nations Charter
Article. 33: '1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial assessment, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.'
40 The Guardian, 25 September
2001.
41 Financial Times, 19
March 2002.
42 Jon Wolfsthal, 'What
Is to Be Done With The Axis of Evil?', Carnegie Proliferation Brief, 6
February 2002.